Perspectival Instruments
Dr Ana-Maria Cretu analyses how perspectivalism enters into ‘scientific instruments’ and associated notions such as objectivity.
Read moreDr Ana-Maria Cretu analyses how perspectivalism enters into ‘scientific instruments’ and associated notions such as objectivity.
Read moreThis open access book explores some of the historical roots and epistemological ramifications of perspectivism. Perspectivism has recently emerged in philosophy of science as an interesting new position in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. But there is a lot more to perspectivism than discussions in philosophy of science so far have suggested. Perspectivism […]
Read moreThis paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not […]
Read moreIn this paper, I go back to Bas van Fraassen’s seminal discussion of perspectivity in the context of scientific representation. I distinguish between two possible ways of locating the perspectival nature of the representation by drawing an analogy between art and science. I highlight a tension between what I call the representationalist assumption and the […]
Read moreIn the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, General Remark to Phenomenology, Kant argued that absolute space “is therefore necessary, not as a concept of an actual object, but rather as an idea, which is to serve as a rule for considering all motion therein merely as relative” (AA 4: 560). I argue that Kantian absolute […]
Read moreThis edited collection is the first of its kind to explore the view called perspectivism in philosophy of science. The book brings together an array of essays that reflect on the methodological promises and scientific challenges of perspectivism in a variety of fields such as physics, biology, cognitive neuroscience, and cancer research, just as a […]
Read moreI analyse the exploratory function of two main modelling practices: targetless fictional models and hypothetical perspectival models. In both cases, I argue, modelers invite us to imagine or conceive something about the target system, which is either known to be non-existent (fictional models) or just hypothetical (in perspectival models). I clarify the kind of imagining […]
Read moreMichela Massimi’s Wilkins-Bernal-Medawar Medal Lecture, Royal Society (2017). In an era where science is increasingly specialised, what is the value of interdisciplinary research? I argue that research across disciplinary boundaries plays a pivotal role in scientific inquiry, and it has a threefold value: it is exploratory; it is unifying; and it offers critical engagement. Philosophy […]
Read moreThe goal of this article is to address the problem of inconsistent models, and the challenge it poses for perspectivism. I analyse the argument, draw attention to some hidden premises behind it, and deflate them. Then I introduce the notion of perspectival models as a distinctive class of modeling practices, whose primary function is exploratory. […]
Read moreOn David Lewis’s influential view, modal facts supervene on the mosaic of non-modal facts about sparse natural properties. I defend a Lewisian account of laws that abandons this supervenience claim in order to avoid the objections of subjectivity and lack of necessity that bedeviled Lewis’s original view. On my view, it is not the Humean […]
Read moreAmong the many varieties of realism in contemporary philosophy of science, perspectivism – or better, perspectival realism – is one of the latest attempts at a middle ground in between scientific realism and antirealism.1 What kind of middle ground can perspectival realism possibly deliver which has not already been explored by structural realism, semi-realism, entity […]
Read moreThis paper addresses a famous objection against David Lewis’ Best System Analysis (BSA) of laws of nature. The objection—anticipated and discussed by Lewis (1994)—focuses on the standards of simplicity and strength being (in part) a matter of psychology. Lewis’ answer to the objection relies on his metaphysics of natural properties and its ability to single […]
Read moreSuccess-to-truth inferences have been the realist stronghold for long time. Scientific success is the parameter by which realists claim to discern approximately true theories from false ones. But scientific success needs be probed a bit deeper. In this paper, I tell three tales of scientific success, by considering in turn success from nowhere, success from […]
Read moreIn this essay, I suggest bringing real realism closer home, namely back to its Kantian roots. The very same roots that make real realism a ‘homely’ kind of realism, against any Grand Metaphysical Conclusions about the world, its causal necessities, and natural kinds. I suggest reinterpreting a key aspect of real realism—i.e., the notion of […]
Read moreIn this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be […]
Read moreReview of the book, Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered: A New Approach to the (Dis)unity of Science by S. Ruphy] BJPS Review of Books. Stéphanie Ruphy // Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered
Read more